Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. By Philip Eyrikson Tetlock and Dan Gardner. New York, N.Y.: Crown Publishers, 2015 by Roche,, Edward M., Ph.D., J.D.
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 9
Number 1 Volume 9, No. 1, Special
Issue Spring 2016: Designing Danger:
Complex Engineering by Violent Non-
State Actors
Article 14
Superforecasting: The Art and
Science of Prediction. By Philip
Eyrikson Tetlock and Dan
Gardner. New York, N.Y.: Crown
Publishers, 2015
Edward M. Roche, Ph.D., J.D.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
pp. 144-145
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roche,, Edward M. Ph.D., J.D.. "Superforecasting: The Art and Science of
Prediction. By Philip Eyrikson Tetlock and Dan Gardner. New York, N.Y.:
Crown Publishers, 2015." Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016) :
144-145.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1519
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/14
 144 
 
Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. By Philip 
Eyrikson Tetlock and Dan Gardner. New York, N.Y.: Crown 
Publishers, 2015. ISBN: 978-0-8041-3669-3. Figures. Notes. 
Sources cited. Index. Pp. 340. $28.00. 
 
At the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1951, when Sherman Kent was 
discussing whether the Soviet Union would attack Yugoslavia, he suggested 
that intelligence estimates such as "serious possibility" be converted to 
numbers, such as “65 to 35 odds in favor of an attack.” No one took his advice.  
 
Now the numbers are back.  Superforecasting reports on a multi-year study 
sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).  
In the study, an army of forecasters attracted from all sectors of U.S. society 
were given hundreds of very specific questions such as whether North Korea 
would set off a nuclear explosion between January 1 to September 1, 2014.  
Eventually, a group of the best forecasters was isolated and compared to 
parallel teams in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).  Result: they out-
performed the IC, and by a significant margin (although the exact number 
remains classified).  The question is why and how, and that is what 
Superforecasting explains. 
 
There are numerous examples of important pundits who have very poor 
forecasting records, but are listened to anyway because no one goes back and 
evaluates their performance.  “To learn from failure, we must know when we 
fail” (181). Comparing forecasters is done with Brier scores, which were taken 
from a 1950 article in Monthly Weather Review that examined how well 
weathermen can tell if it will rain.   Superforecasters have the lowest (best) 
Brier scores, and this is an important point in the book: to improve 
forecasting, one needs to keep track of how accurate forecasts have been, and 
learn what works and what doesn't.  
 
None of the superforecasters identified have any intelligence background, yet 
they routinely out-perform professionals in the IC.  What are they like? 
Superforecasters score better than about 80% of the population on 
intelligence and knowledge tests.  They are smarter, but “most fall well short 
of so-called genius territory” (109).  They tend to break problems into 
components and make estimates for each part then put them together to get 
an overall estimate.  They tend to start with an anchor estimate (base rate), 
then make incremental (granular) adjustments as new data arrives, rather 
than overreacting to new information. They tend to synthesize other views 
with their own, and keep re-thinking and scrutinizing their own assumptions. 
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They avoid getting stuck on any particular idea or agenda.  They have “little 
ego invested in each forecast” (163). There is an interesting anecdote about an 
expert in armaments who was a great forecaster for everything except 
questions on arms.   
 
They tend to be probabilistic and nondeterministic thinkers, e.g., they do not 
believe in “meant to be,” and do not believe anything necessarily has to 
happen.  Nothing is ever really “certain” and things are considered much 
more complex than they at first appear.  They consider not the “why” but the 
“how,” and easily work in numbers.  Typically, they are intellectually curious 
persons who enjoy mental challenges.   
 
Putting superforecasters into teams was a challenge, but turned out to be 
successful–teams were 23% more accurate than individuals, and 30% more 
accurate than prediction markets such as Inkling and Lumenogic.  “If 
forecasters can keep questioning themselves and their teammates, and 
welcome vigorous debate, the group can become more than the sum of its 
parts” (198).  People learned to offer thanks for constructive criticism.  
Superforecasters who were joined into teams became 50% more accurate. 
Teams need to be diverse.  The researchers worked out an “extremizing 
algorithm” that would cause even regular forecaster teams enough of a boost 
to outperform some superforecaster teams.   
 
The book’s strength is its clarity of presentation, and numerous examples to 
introduce its insights.  It has an appendix entitled “Ten Commandments for 
Aspiring Superforecasters” that contains advice such as “Break seemingly 
intractable problems into tractable sub-problems,” which is what the authors 
call “Fermi-izing,” named after the physicist Enrico Fermi (1901-1954). But 
the appendix only makes sense after the reader has studied the book. The 
notes are extensive and have key references to key journal articles that allow 
the reader to look more deeply into various issues.  In the end, however, there 
is a feeling of wanting more insight on exactly how superforecasters do their 
work, and more about how the IARPA project was operated.  Nevertheless, 
merely reading the book will change one’s perspective and behavior.   
 
Superforecasters is very much worth reading by intelligence professionals, or 
by anyone in any field who is interested in understanding how to look into the 
future.  It should be required reading for all students interested in 
intelligence, and for professors who teach intelligence – they should update 
their courses to reflect these new insights.  
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